Historically, Bengal has always been a pivotal link between South Asia and East Asia, primarily due to its strategic geo-economic position. With ancient trade routes connecting Bengal to China both by land and sea, this region, once encompassing areas like Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, the Seven Sisters of Northeast India, and Burma, has long served as a bridge between the East and West. In recent times, Bangladesh, the successor of Bengal, is once again finding itself at the center of global connectivity due to its geographical significance—particularly in the eyes of China.

China, a nation deeply rooted in trade, is now more determined than ever to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reviving the historical Silk Road with Bangladesh as a key node. However, Bangladesh’s strategic relations with China have been a topic of complex deliberation, especially during Sheikh Hasina’s administration, which faced the dilemma of balancing ties between China and its neighboring giant, India.

On the military front, Bangladesh relies heavily on Chinese arms and ammunition, even though most of its military officers receive training in the United States. Yet, acquiring military equipment from the U.S. remains challenging due to costs and the stringent requirements of agreements like the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). These agreements are seen by the U.S. as essential for safeguarding American technological secrets, making it difficult for Bangladesh to procure U.S. arms. As a result, Bangladesh continues to favor Chinese military supplies.

India, as Bangladesh’s dominant neighbor, is particularly sensitive to the growing China-Bangladesh connection, especially concerning strategic assets like the Chittagong Port, Mongla Port, and the Teesta River. The Hasina administration has navigated these geopolitical waters cautiously, attempting to balance the interests of both China and India. India, however, did not take lightly Bangladesh’s purchase of submarines from China, even going as far as altering routes for Asian highways and railways to connect its northeastern states.

Despite these complexities, China has maintained a long-standing friendship with Bangladesh, dating back to President Ziaur Rahman’s tenure. China’s approach has consistently been one of non-interference, focusing primarily on trade and the Belt and Road Initiative. This contrasts sharply with India’s more direct involvement in Bangladesh’s internal politics, which some argue has contributed to the survival of undemocratic elements within the Hasina administration.

China’s commitment to Bangladesh’s development was evident when it stepped in to finance the Padma Bridge after the World Bank withdrew, citing corruption within the Awami League government. China has also expressed interest in developing the Teesta project. However, recent agreements between Bangladesh and India on the Teesta, Mongla Port, and transit security have caused a rift, with China displaying a notably cool demeanor during Sheikh Hasina’s subsequent visit to Beijing.

China’s past reservations with the BNP over the Taiwan issue seem to have faded, as the recent student movement led to the downfall of Hasina’s government. Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen has since assured the interim government, led by Dr. Yunus, of continued Chinese support for ongoing projects.

In a move that signals China’s intention to strengthen ties with a post-Hasina Bangladesh, Ambassador Yao Wen has recently met with leaders of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, indicating that China is serious about maintaining its influence in the region.

While U.S. support for India appears to be a countermeasure against China’s growing influence in Bangladesh, experts believe China poses no direct threat to Bangladesh. Taiwanese journalists, in a recent talk show, emphasized that China’s primary focus remains on trade and the Belt and Road Initiative, a strategy that applies equally to its relations with Bangladesh. They also noted that China avoids entangling itself in the political or religious movements of other nations, raising questions about its recent outreach to Bangladesh’s main Islamist party.

As China navigates these intricate dynamics, one thing is certain: its long-term strategy in Bangladesh is deeply anchored in trade and infrastructure development, solidifying its role as a key player in the region’s future. This region, historically serving as a bridge between the two nations’ geo-economic landscapes, exemplifies the enduring "Tiger-Dragon connection."

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Author: Avik Sanwar Rahman, Executive Editor, The Bay Wave, New Tork